DOI: 10.22403/UQROOMX/RMC05/02

ACTIVISMO CONSULAR DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS EN EL CARIBE, 1783-1903

St. Kitts-Nevis ante la crisis azucarera, la agitación laboral y las propuestas de adquisición estadounidenses

HUMBERTO GARCÍA MUÑIZ
JOSÉ LEE BORGES
University of Puerto Rico

RÉSUMÉ

Ce travail examine les traits essentiels de l'activité consulaire nordaméricaine dans les Caraïbes au cours de la période signalée, surtout dans certaines colonies européennes de la région, comme la République Dominicaine et Haïti. On y souligne le rôle qu'ont joué les consuls dans le cadre de la politique annexionniste entreprise par les États-Unis. L'auteur, utilisant diverses dépêches consulaires inédites provenant de St. Kitts-Nevis, analyse les problèmes occasionnés par la dépression de l'industrie sucrière et les troubles sociaux qui en résultent ainsi que la tentative nordaméricaine (sur les instances consulaires) d'acquérir les deux îles caraïbes. Ce processus s'explique dans le cadre de la décadence britannique dans l'aire caraïbe et de la naissance de l'hégémonie américaine consacrée par les évènements de 1898, résultant particulièrement de la politique coloniale de Joseph Chamberlain.

SAMENVATTING

Het artikel analyseert de consulaire activiteiten van de Verenigde Staten in het Caraïbisch gebied tussen 1783 en 1903, met speciale aandacht voor twee Europese kolonies in de regio, St. Kitts en Nevis. De auteurs brengen vooral naar voren de rol die de diverse consuls gespeeld hadden in het kader van de agressieve politiek van de Verenigde Staten. Verschillende conulaire geschriften, die hier voor het eerst worden gepubliceerd, geven weer de Noordamerikaanse poging om eigenaar te worden van deze twee eilanden in een context van crisis van de suikerindustrie. De verzwakking van de Englese hegemonie in de regio en het begin van de hegemonie van de Verenigde Staten na 1898 verklaren dit proces, geïllustreerd aan de hand van de koloniale politiek van Joseph Chamberlain.

DOI: 10.22403/UQROOMX/RMC05/02

U. S. CONSULAR ACTIVISM IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1783-1903

With special reference to St. Kitts-Nevis' sugar depression, labor turmoil and its proposed acquisition by the United States[1]

HUMBERTO GARCÍA MUÑIZ
Y JOSÉ LEE BORGES
University of Puerto Rico

I should myself like to shape our own foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all other European nations, including England.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 9 February 1898

These islands [Leeward and Windward] each enjoy the somewhat unique position of belonging nominally to one country but geographically and politically and financially to another.
JOSEPH HAVEN, U. S. Commercial Agent, Basseterre, St. Kitts, 26 July 1902

ABSTRACT

This article examines U. S. consular activism in the Caribbean from 1783-1903, specifically their political/diplomatic roles in the european colonies in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Emphasis is given to

[1] This article is a partial result of a research project in the Center for Historical Research, History Department, Humanities Faculty, University of Puerto Rico, which studies U. S. consular activities in the independent Caribbean countries (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) and in the non-Spanish European colonies during 1898. Betsaida Vélez Natal, María Eugenia Estades Font, María Dolores Luque de Sánchez, Margarita Mergal, and Luis Martínez Fernández kindly read a draft of the article and offered valuable criticisms. The authors thank Carmen Gloria Romero, Awilda Brocco, and Manuel Martínez of the José M. Lázaro General Library for their cooperation in locating publications cited here. Dr. García Muñiz is indebted for their comments to the students of his research seminar on United States-Caribbean relations in the Graduate Program of the History Department, University of Puerto Rico.

the role played by the consuls in the annexionist policies of the United States. Several dispatches, hitherto unpublished, of the U. S. consuls in St. Kitts-Nevis are analyzed. These despatches address the depression and labor turmoil in the sugar industry and a consular proposal for the acquisition of the two-island colonial territory by the United States. Great Britain's retrenchment from the Caribbean in the light of U. S. growing hegemony in the region as a result of the 1898 war is discussed, particulary the colonial policies of Joseph Chamberlain.

Resumen

El trabajo examina los rasgos esenciales de la actividad consular estadounidense en el Caribe durante el periodo referido, con énfasis en las colonias europeas de St. Kitts-Nevis. Se coloca en relieve el papel desempeñado por los cónsules en el marco de la política anexionista emprendida por los Estados Unidos. Mediante el empleo de varios despachos consulares inéditos, suscritos en St. Kitts-Nevis, los autores analizan los problemas derivados de la depresión de la industria azucarera y la inconformidad laboral resultante, así como la tentativa norteamericana (mediante la instancia consular) para la adquisición de dos islas caribeñas. Este proceso es explicado en el marco de la decadencia inglesa en el Caribe y el nacimiento de la hegemonía estadounidense patentizada por los acontecimientos de 1898, en especial a resultas de la política colonial de Joseph Chamberlain.

Introduction

In 1898, by militarily taking over Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States took the first step toward its main geopolitical objective in the Caribbean: the establishment of an isthmian canal under U. S. exclusive control. U. S. policymakers knew that the commercial value of the future canal was as important as strategic and military considerations for a growing industrial power searching for export markets. The frenzy for the acquisition of the canal and attendant naval bases and coaling stations in the Caribbean and the Pacific intensified after the Spanish-Cuban-American War. Construction of military bases —Guantánamo in Cuba and Culebra in Puerto Rico— for the protection of the canal started before President Theodore Roosevelt signed the 1904 treaty giving the United States "titular sovereignty" to the 10-mile canal zone

(Estades Font, 1988, 147-164).[2] American eyes surveyed meticulously anew the Samaná Bay in the Dominican Republic, Môle-St. Nicolas in Haiti and the European colonies in the Caribbean looking for further strategic locations to guard the canal and the increased volume of trade expected to pass through its locks in the future. Britain's Caribbean colonies were not exempted from this scrutiny, even by those —like the leading U. S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan and the well-known expansionist, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge— who promoted Anglo-American *rapprochement*.

Against this backdrop, the first part of the article reviews U. S. consular activism in the European colonies in the Caribbean, Haiti and the Dominican Republic from 1783 to 1903. Scant attention has been given to the political/diplomatic role of U. S. consular officials in the Caribbean territories and to the link between these and commercial roles. Consular officers played the diplomatic/political role either by their own volition or because they were forced by circumstances: the colonial condition of most Caribbean territories precluded the appointment of diplomatic officers.

To further illustrate the link between the commercial and political/diplomatic roles of the U. S. consular officers, the second part of the article examines three main themes in short introductions to several dispatches, until now unpublished, of the U. S. consular officials in the British colony of St. Kitts-Nevis during the years 1896 to 1903.[3] These themes —depression and labor turmoil in the sugar industry plus acquisition by the United States— are discussed in the changing context of U. S.-Great Britain relations at the turn of the century.

Background on the U. S. Consular Service

U. S. consular officers were appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their main role was

[2] A phrase coined in 1904 by William Howard Taft, then U. S. Secretary of War, quoted in Walter LaFeber (1979, 44).

[3] "St. Christopher," the original name of the island, became shortened to "St. Kitts" at the end of the seventeenth century. Long-standing antipathy between the islands characterizes their relationship as attested recently by the report that the Nevis legislature voted unanimously on 14 October 1997 to leave the federation with St. Kitts. See *Miami Herald* (16 October 1997).

fostering U. S. trade. In 1833, because of the first systematic reorganization of the Department of State, a Consular Bureau was established to take charge of all matters related to commerce. There were three grades of consular service, namely, consul, consul general, and commercial agents.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the State Department regularly published reports from consular officers of business opportunities abroad. In 1897, the Bureau of Foreign Commerce (formerly Bureau of Statistics) began publishing daily reports and circulated instructions to all U. S. consuls to "give special attention to the question of extending the sales of American manufacturers."[4] After 1898, extracts from the daily *Advances Sheets of Consular Reports* started to appear in general and trade journals. In 1903 the Bureau was transferred to the newly-created Department of Commerce and Labor, but the Secretary of State directed consular officers to gather and report useful information about foreign and domestic commerce.[5]

Consular service was based on a combination of the patronage system of appointment and the fee system. Patronage allowed the President to reward political supporters or to deport political undesirables (Paterson, 1966, 80-81; Fletcher 1984, 127-132). Instead of salaries, consular officers were allowed to continue their own private business and to receive payment from the fees collected in the performance of their consular duties. If the consulate was not important, consular and commercial agents were appointed from the resident alien community, despite nationality. Commercial agents were singled out for criticism. Many were aliens residing in small areas not warranting a consulate and used their connections in the United States to promote their own commercial interests. Many complaints of incompetent personnel and uneven and exorbitant fees led to several unsuccessful attempts to reform during the second half of the nineteenth century (Crane, 1960, 51-68; Becker, 1982, Chapter 5). In 1906, consular service was reorganized "into a professionalized foreign-trade bureaucracy" by the (Henry Cabot) Lodge Bill, an executive decree of President Theodore Roosevelt, the administration of

[4] Quoted in Emily S. Rosenberg (1982, 56).

[5] At least up to the 1930s, consular officials provided detailed economic, commercial and industrial information in the publications of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. See, for example, Gerard Harris, special agent and various U. S. consular officers (1917).

Secretary of State Elihu Root and Consular Bureau Chief Wilbur J. Carr (Rosenberg, 1982, 56).[6]

U. S. Consular Activism in the Caribbean

Commercial relations with the Caribbean acquired great importance in the early years of the United States. U. S. consular officers in the Caribbean first appeared in Havana, Cuba, in 1783; Kingston, Jamaica, in 1796; Aux Cayes and Cap Haïtien, Saint Domingue (later Haiti); in Curaçao, the Dutch Antilles, in 1797; Cayenne in French Guiana and Demerara in 1801; and Nassau, Bahamas, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1821.[7]

Havana surpassed most Caribbean ports in its importance to the nascent United States. The new republic appointed consular officers early, but several experienced great difficulty as Spain refused them recognition.[8] In the early 1810s William Shaler was appointed as commercial agent, the first U. S. consular officer who openly sided with the annexionist movement in Cuba (Portell Vila, 1938, 170-171; Nichols, 1933). The sugar planter class in Cuba, with extensive commercial and social ties with the United States, reasoned that annexation to the United States meant the continuance of the slave trade and slavery and free access to the U. S. market (Pérez, 1990, 36-37).[9]

In 1820 the U. S. consular agent Michael Hogan wrote the first dis-

[6] The new law provided giving officers higher salaries, placing restrictions in the hiring of foreigners, and introducing the civil-service system. It left unchanged the patronage system of appointment and ignored the non partisan basis for selection or of promotion based on merit. It was not until the Rogers Act of 1924 that politics was taken out of the consular service. For further information see Stuart (1936), Crane (1960, 77-103, 245-268), and Paterson (1966, 85-97).

[7] The dates are based on the first year that appears in the list of consulates published in "Appendix III: Consular Post Records and Consular Dispatches from Latin America in the National Archives of the United States," in George S. Ulibarri & John P. Harrison (1974, 423-433). See John H. Coatsworth (1967).

[8] France recognized U. S. consular agents in Martinique before granting diplomatic and political recognition to the United States. When learning that mulattoes took control of Guadeloupe, U. S. Consul Edward James stated that it did not matter to him whether trade was carried on with black, yellow or white men and that anyway, the best fishing was on troubled waters. See Rayford W. Logan (1941, 137-169).

[9] In his fascinating account of annexionist thought in Cuba and the United States during the nineteenth century, José Ignacio Rodríguez credited "the strength of material interests" as the force behind annexationism, specifically the sugar connection which made Cuba "a dependency of the United States of America." José Ignacio Rodríguez (1900, 10-11). Our thanks to Dr. Javier Figueroa for referring us to this valuable book.

patch promoting the acquisition of Cuba from the U. S. side, when he said that Cubans opposed the possibility of British domination, but

> acknowledge their incapacity for self-government, should they have some supreme powers elsewhere they would prefer (if it depended on them) a connection with the United States being in heart Republicans, it is solely those who hold dear bought titles, and wear badges of distinction, that would be opposed to it, but although they are many, they would sink into insignificance on the question being agitated.[10]

Another instance of the U. S. consul promoting territorial acquisitions in the Spanish Caribbean occurred with Puerto Rico in 1867 when Spain dismissed U. S. Consul Alexander Jourdan because of his alleged annexionist activities. Puerto Rico's primary export economy depended on trade with the United States. A year earlier, liberal, scientist and educator, José Julián Acosta, proclaimed: "Without the consumer and producer market of the United States, it can be assured that Puerto Rican agriculture would not have developed" (Acosta, 1866, 323). The extent of Jourdan's activities is not clear, but in the context of Secretary of State William H. Seward's commercial and territorial expansionist agenda in the Caribbean, Jourdan wrote:

> there is no doubt, that the island of Porto Rico, by its situation, fertility and resources of all kinds, if it could be obtained, would prove a far better acquisition, on every respect.[11]

In Haiti, the U. S. consular officer showed an awareness of U. S. geopolitical interests. In 1849 U. S. acting Commercial Agent S. Simmonise, alluding to the interest of British and French consuls in Môle-St. Nicolas, wrote the State Department that "If ever the Isthmus of Panama be cut, and the commerce of the world changed, what an acquisition to a great maritime power would those points present?" (Logan, 1941, 245).

Here also consular recognition was not automatic. Haiti rejected the recognition of U. S. consular officers until the 1850s, although the United

[10] Quoted in Portell Vila (1938, 200). For a short discussion on the link of race and color with annexionist and independence movements in Cuba see Gordon K. Lewis (1983, 155-156).

[11] Félix Ojeda Reyes (1998, 156). See Centro de Investigaciones Históricas (1982). While in the Department of State, Seward emphasized how commerce served as "the chief agent of... advancement in civilization and enlargement of empire" and argued that "political supremacy follows commercial ascendancy." Quoted in Alfred E. Eckes (1995, 68-69).

States had appointed commercial agents since the 1790s (Logan, 1941, 31, 232, 251). Haiti wanted diplomatic recognition before giving sanction to U. S. consular officers, but failed as the United States only granted it during the Civil War (1862).

Undoubtedly, the most dramatic annexionist attempt by the United States —in collusion with a local political clique headed by President Buenaventura Báez— took place in the Dominican Republic during the 1860s and 1870s.[12] President Ulysses Grant's bid did not win the U. S. Senate's support, even after an incredible 15 695 to eleven-plebiscite vote for annexation in the Caribbean state.[13] Historical works have long recognized the important roles of Joseph Fabens and William Cazneau, "a remarkable pair, full of schemes, avid for money and devoid of scruples," as 'special agents.' [14]

Again the role played by the consular officers failed to receive proper recognition, since they were party to, if not the proponents of, the original plan that evolved and ended in the annexionist flop. Francis Harrison, who in 1847 became the first U. S. commercial agent in the country, had hinted the year before "that recognition might lead the Government of the Dominican Republic to grant to the United States some port which would serve as a naval station."[15] At different times Samaná Bay emerged as the favorite site for a naval base, a coaling station or a free port. In 1866 and 1867, Assistant Secretary of State, Frederick W. Seward, William H.

[12] The best-known works on this subject are Sumner Welles (1928) and Charles C. Tansill (1938). The most recent works are William Javier Nelson (1990) and Diómedes Núñez Polanco (1997).

[13] Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (1960, 21). Charles Sumner led the opposition to annexation in the higher chamber, but a year later, in 1871, when chairing the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, he suggested that it should be demanded that Great Britain leave the Western Hemisphere, including all of its possessions and islands. See John Bassett Moore (1898, 525).

[14] Allan Nevins (1957, 254). For an analysis of the role of Fabens and of the Cazneaus (William and his wife Jane) as 'special agents' in the Dominican Republic see Robert E. May (1979). U. S. presidents employed executive agents *1)* to evade confirmation of diplomatic appointments by the Senate; *2)* to open relations with unrecognized states or governments; *3)* to contact countries with which the United States had broken relations; *4)* to maintain relations with colonial and dependent states or with countries with which the United States had no regular diplomatic officers; or *5)* for private negotiations by the executive on various business. See a description of their role in various Caribbean countries in Henry Merritt Wriston (1929).

[15] Tansill (1938, 126). Harrison included his suggestion in a report to John Hogan, who had been appointed commissioner to consider the recognition of the Dominican Republic, which had attained independence from Haiti in 1844.

Seward's son, headed the negotiations to secure Samaná. Yet, it was U. S. Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith who negotiated in the Dominican Republic.[16]

U. S. consular officers intervened also in the politics of the Hispanic Caribbean, sovereign and colonial. In 1869, the consular officer in Danish St. Thomas, John F. Robeson, helped General Gregorio Luperón, President Báez's foremost opponent, to reclaim his steamer *Telégrafo* by making it pass as an American ship. The same Robeson helped Dr. Ramón Emeterio Betances, Puerto Rico's leading *abolicionista* and *separatista*, to continue his trip to New York by blocking an attempt by the Danish colonial governor to turn him over to the Spanish authorities (Ramos Mattei, 1987, 55-63). Fifteen years later, in 1884, aware of U. S. interests and of President Ulises Heureaux's intentions about Samaná Bay, Betances attempted, and failed, to internationalize the site by promoting a private settlement of French colonists in the area, thus "making it inaccessible to Anglo-Saxons' appetites and assuring its independence" (Betances, 1884, 247).

J. Hartog's *US Consul in 19th Century Curaçao: The Life and Works of Leonard Burlington Smith* perhaps best describes the activities of a merchant serving as U. S. vice-consul and consul in one of the Caribbean's leading trade ports (Hartog, 1971). Leonard Burlington Smith was an extraordinary businessperson; he built a shipyard, imported ice and wood, exported salt from Bonaire, designed and constructed Curaçao's first pontoon-bridge, and established the first water and electric systems.

From 1881 to 1898, Smith's consular business included the commercial and political domains. Smith feared German plans toward the Caribbean, particularly as that country was so active in neighboring Venezuela (Holger Herwig, 1986). Thus, when in 1891 Smith heard the rumor that Germany was to take over Curaçao, he immediately urged Washington, without success, to set up a coaling station in the Dutch Caribbean colony.[17] He wrote:

[16] Tansill writes that after two communications by Smith informing that in return for financial assistance, the Dominican government would extend the use of coal mines in Samaná and the keys called 'Levantado' and 'Carenero,' Secretary of State William Seward "began to evince a most anxious desire to secure Samaná as a naval base." Tansill (1938, 234). See also Ernest N. Paolino (1973, 121-122).

[17] In 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote: "Is the United States, for instance, prepared to allow Germany to acquire the Dutch stronghold of Curaçao, fronting the Atlantic outlet of both the proposed canals of Panama and Nicaragua?" Captain A. T. Mahan (1897, 15).

> the acquisition by purchase or otherwise of this little island by Germany which as is well known has always been looking with a covetous eye on it, would give the entire control of Venezuela's commerce in their hands to the detriment of ours. The most intelligent people here fear the consequence to this island of a German victory in case of a European war, as they are so closely allied to the United States by its commerce.[18]

At the turn of the century, the consular service continued to protect U. S. trade, then increasingly meaning the export of U. S. manufactured goods. It comprised more than three hundred consular officers in all parts of the world, dealing mainly with business, international trade, and shipping matters. Their role, as perceived by a contemporary writer, was simple: "They are above all things else, agents of trademessengers of commerce" (Conner, 1900, 44). The establishment at the U. S. consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, of a commercial reading room with American trade journals and directories, magazines and newspapers, and catalogue of manufacturers shows the initiative of that particular consul in promoting U. S. products.[19]

Yet U. S. consuls in the Caribbean carried out their other role of furthering U. S. political presence, sometimes to the extent of promoting acquisition. In Haiti, "as a measure of strategic security" in view of German interests, black Consul William F. Powell, "a one man chamber-of-commerce," worked hard to promote U. S. trade preponderance.[20] He wanted Haiti to "unknowingly be forced into a close connection with us... and our influence in the Republic would become paramount and permanent" (Montague, 1940, 200).

In the cases of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the U. S. consuls prompted military intervention and annexation just before the outbreak of the Spanish-Cuban-American War.[21] In Havana, Consul General Fitzhugh Lee, "virtually a diplomatic official," was positive that U. S. investments would nullify Cuban opposition and bring annexation: "...American

[18] Quoted in Hartog (1971, 57).

[19] On a daily basis, local merchants and buyers came to find out about American goods. See Frederick Van Dyne (1907, 166-167).

[20] Ludwell Lee Montague (1940, 168). With few foreign service appointments available to them, blacks of the Republican Party were assigned to diplomatic and consular appointments in Haiti and Liberia. See Brenda Gayle Plummer (1988, 79).

[21] During the war Great Britain took over U. S. consulates in Cuba and "the extent of the services they performed can hardly be estimated." Also, British Caribbean colonies maintained "an attitude of benevolent neutrality." Bertha Ann Reuter (1924, 96-101).

capital and enterprising spirit would be so great that when the matter of annexation came up, the Cuban people would not be a factor in deciding the problem."[22]

From St. Thomas, where he had taken refuge, the U. S. consul in San Juan, P. C. Hanna, contributed information on the military capacity of the Spanish forces in Puerto Rico, commented that Puerto Rico was the best place to acclimate soldiers because it was the "healthiest island in the West Indies," and devised an invasion plan for taking and holding Puerto Rico as a coaling station.[23] Independent from the U. S. annexionist designs, annexationism in Cuba and Puerto Rico was an important political force of its own, with a material, social and ideological basis, not necessarily similar, nor equally strong.[24]

The Spanish-Cuban-American War affected U. S.-Britain relations in the wider international context. In May 1898, London's *Pall Mall Gazette* published that the United States might trade the Philippines for certain British possessions in the Caribbean (Reuter, 1924, 170). Another British newspaper, *The Statist*, outright suggested selling them to the United States (Reuter, 1924, 170). In August of that year, U. S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge submitted to Secretary of State William Day a list of islands (Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Danish Virgin Islands) to be exchanged for the Philippines except Luzon.[25] During the next month Consul Louis A. Dent, of Kingston, Jamaica, replied to an inquiry of the *New York Commercial* about "a sentiment of annexation to the United States" that

> I have been advised that Petitions to the Crown are being circulated praying for some arrangement by which the Island may be transferred. I have as well heard suggestions put forth by prominent people here that annexation would be the best outcome of the present condition of the Island.[26]

[22] Fletcher (1984, 128) and Phillip S. Foner (1972, 239). After the war, Lee served as military governor of the Havana province.

[23] Quoted in Gervasio Luis García (1997, 46).

[24] See Ramos Mattei (1987, 50-53) and Laird Bergad (1988) and Jorge Ibarra (1996). For an analysis of the annexionist movement in the Hispanic Caribbean during the middle decades of the nineteenth century see Luis Martínez Fernández (1994).

[25] Sen. Cabot Lodge wanted Great Britain to purchase the Danish Virgin Islands and turn them over to the United States. See John A. Garrity (1953, 198-199).

[26] Louis A. Dent to John B. Moore (1898). The consul noted that in view of "the decline of the sugar industry," there was a "strong feeling" that "the commercial predominance of the United States in Cuba and Puerto Rico will result in the ultimate ruin of the island."

A year earlier, influential naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan had written that "in matters of entrance to the Caribbean, and of general interior control of that sea [Jamaica] is certainly the most important single position in the Caribbean Sea."[27] It is no accident, then, that Jamaica showed up on Cabot Lodge's list.

The turn of the century marked a critical turning point for Great Britain, economically and militarily. In Europe, Germany and France developed their industrial base, while extending their international trade. The United States led the way in the Western Hemisphere and started to assert its power in the Far East, having already surpassed British steel production in the 1880s (Friedberg, 1988, 25). In the Far East Japan started to act very much like the United States and not surprisingly Great Britain followed accommodative policies with both powers. As shown in Figure 1, Great Britain slowly lost its manufacturing leadership to the United States and Germany. Despite these changes in economic power, the United States and Great Britain continued to be each others' most important trading partners, but with variations in the nature of the trade (Orde, 1996, 36-37).

As the century ended, the United States became the hegemonic power of the region and Britain's Caribbean colonies passed into the U. S. sphere of influence. In 1899 Theodore Roosevelt revived Lodge's recommendation of trading the Philippines for Britain's departure from the American continent (Beale, 1956, 146). A year later, his friend and trusted confidant, Brooks Adams, writing about "the decay of Britain" and "England's decadence in the West Indies," pronounced:

> The West Indies are gravitating toward the United States; therefore, the West Indies must be consolidated and the lines of communication with them shortened and cheapened. Therefore, a canal to the Pacific must be built... [Adams, 1900, 107, 132, 134].

With the Venezuelan crisis in 1895, the Spanish-Cuban-American War, and the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, Great Britain acquiesced to U. S. strategic-military hegemony in the region. Britain's retrenchment from the Caribbean responded to the protection of its interests in Europe itself

[27] Mahan also mentioned that St. Lucia "adequately represents all other British islands," but noted that "they have the disadvantage of being very small islands, consequently without adequate natural resources, and easy to be blockaded by all sides." Captain A. T. Mahan (1897, 287, 306-307).

	1870	*1881-1885*	*1896-1900*	*1906-1910*	*1913*
United States	23.3	28.6	30.1	35.3	35.8
Germany	13.2	13.9	16.6	15.9	15.7
Britain	31.8	26.6	19.5	14.7	14.0
France	10.3	8.6	7.1	6.4	6.4
Russia	3.7	3.4	5.0	5.0	50.

Source: League of Nations, *Industrialization and foreign Trade* (New York, 1945), p. 13, adapted from Table 2.1 in Friedberg (1988, 26).

and in other parts of the world.[28] Great Britain felt that the Monroe Doctrine and the No-Transfer corollary secured its British Caribbean colonies (Joseph, 1973, 35). No opposition came from the United States when Britain claimed the island of Patos, between Trinidad and the Venezuelan coast in 1902. Despite misgivings about the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the views of important policymakers such as Lodge and Roosevelt, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour expressed Britain's official stand on the Monroe Doctrine for the U. S. government and public:

> ...the Monroe Doctrine has no enemies in this country that I know of. We welcome any increase of the influence of the United States of America upon the great Western Hemisphere. We desire no colonization, we desire no acquisition of territory.[29]

Britain believed that its acquiescence to U. S. regional hegemony did not extend to its commercial, economic and financial affairs in the Caribbean, least of all in its colonies (Kneer, 1975, 70-88). In 1902, at least with Cuba, Britain was mistaken. Lionel Carden, the British representative, observed, when complaining about the impossibility of protecting effectively British interests without antagonizing the United States, that "the political and commercial sides of the Cuban question are so interwoven that it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins" (Kneer 1975, 216). As the century came to an end, "Constructive Imperialism" raised its head shortly in England, with Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain seeking economic and social betterment in England by developing the Empire resources.[30]

British or local capital (sometimes both absentee) controlled the sugar industry in Britain's colonies in the Caribbean. The United States controlled their sugar trade however, at least after 1880 (Beachey, 1957, 137-155). As their counterparts in Cuba and Puerto Rico, British Caribbean sugar planters —and other exporters of agricultural products— led

[28] For an analysis of the relative decline of the British Empire see Paul Kennedy (1989, 224-232).

[29] Quoted in Warren G. Kneer (1975, 61). A U. S. historian dismissed as "primarily talk" proposals circulating to organize the British Caribbean colonies into a confederation and of closer cooperation between them and Canada for trade and government. See Wilfrid H. Callcott (1977 [1942], 133).

[30] In 1896 Chamberlain presented to a Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire the creation of an imperial customs union, a zollverein. The plan was not welcome either in England or in several colonies, such as Canada and New Zealand. See S. B. Saul (1957, 173-175) and Robert V. Kubicek (1969, 157-161).

the call in favor of annexation to the United States (Pérez, 1990, XIII-XV; Meléndez, 1988, 15-23; García, 1997, 49-52). Jamaican historian Patrick Bryan says Jamaica's annexation foundered on the issue of U. S. institutional racism (Bryan, 1991, 2-5, 70-71). Yet surely the island's white planter class, the main advocates of annexation, did not oppose it for that reason. The Royal Commission appointed to consider the conditions and prospects of the British Caribbean sugar-producing colonies (chaired by Sir Henry Norman, a former Colonial Governor of Jamaica) pondered the problem and concluded that "persons who wished to transfer their nationality to the United States were but a limited class" (Beachey, 1957, 159). Interestingly enough, annexionist talk did not go away in Jamaica for at least another decade. In 1912, Dr. Theodore Meikle, a physician, wrote that the annexation scheme of the British Caribbean colonies "has substantial backing, both in the West Indies and in America, we are made to realize that there is more to reality in the movement than some are willing to admit" (Meikle, 1912). The social extent and depth of the movement in the individual colonies of the British and Spanish Caribbean warrants further research.

United States-St. Kitts relations

St. Kitts was one of the so-called *islas inútiles* of the Lesser Antilles not colonized by Spain due to the combativeness of the Carib Indians, the lack of resources, and the allure of greater riches in *tierra firme*. The Carib Indians called it "Liamuiga" meaning "fertile" and the Europeans later called it the "Mother of the English West Indies" because the first settlement in the Antilles by people of English nationality began here in 1624, in joint occupation with the French. Within thirty years slave-operated sugar estates became the dominant economic activity in the 68-square mile island. War among the different European powers kept the sugar industry underdeveloped until 1713 when it took off as St. Kitts became exclusively English territory. The fortification of Brimstone Hill symbolized British power. During the various reorganizations of the Leeward Islands that took place in the nineteenth century, Anguilla (1871) and Nevis (1882) came under the administration of St. Kitts.[31]

[31] In the Federation of the Leeward Islands (1871-1956), the islands (Antigua, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Montserrat and St. Kitts) retained a part of their former autonomy. A former Colonial Governor said the Federation was "like driving a team of five ponies, each following a different way." Quoted in Sir Reginald St.-Johnstone (1936, 55).

Anguilla is some sixty miles away to the north, while Nevis, thirty square miles in size, is to the southeast, just across a two-mile stretch of water known as The Narrows.[32]

The commercial relationship between the English colonies in North America and the Caribbean started in full force in the mid-seventeenth century during the English Civil War. British historian Richard Pares stated that the trade in muscavado sugar and its byproducts (molasses and rum) for staple foods and lumber products became crucial for the economic growth of both areas before the American Revolution: "Without it the sugar colonies could not have existed and the North American colonies could not have developed" (Pares, 1968, 1). St. Kitts-Nevis benefitted from this trade; planters prospered while it lasted: "In proportion to its extent, St. Kitts was the richest colony in the British Empire on the eve of the American Revolution" (Sheridan, 1974, 160).

With the independence of the thirteen North American colonies, the British Caribbean sugar islands lost a large share of that market for several decades, while the French and later the Spanish Caribbean colonies increased their trade.[33] At mid-nineteenth century they also lost their preferential position in the British market with the parliamentary repeal of the sugar duties. One immediate result was the call for annexation to the United States in Jamaica and several other British Caribbean colonies (Burns, 1965, 659). Eric Williams comments on this turning point:

> The final introduction of the new system coincided with an event which in the West Indies had symbolic significance. The great fortress of Brimstone Hill in St. Kitts, called familiarly 'the Gibraltar of the Caribbean' , constructed by slave labour in the heyday of the sugar interest, was evacuated by British troops in 1852. The military bastion became thereafter a tourist attraction [Williams, 1970, 320].[34]

[32] In 1982 Anguilla returned to full colonial status under the British government, following a rebellion in 1967 and subsequent events, including ejection of a British envoy, two referendums, and the passing of various Acts by the British Parliament.

[33] Illicit trade appeared immediately and local merchants supported it wholeheartedly, despite British attempts to stop it. In 1784, Captain Horatio Nelson, later of Trafalgar fame, was shunned by the populace and the merchants when he cleared the Basseterre harbor of American vessels. The next year he reported that "the residents of these Islands [the Leeward] are Americans by connexion and by interest, and are inimical to Great Britain. They are as great rebels as ever were in America, had they the power to show it." Quoted in Sir Alan Burns (1965, 245). See Lowell J. Ragatz (1928) and F. Lee Benns (1923).

[34] St. Kitts' strategic value was minimal, at least for Mahan, who when discussing the Battle of the Saints of 1782 wrote that "St. Kitt's *[sic]* in itself might not be worth a great risk." Captain A. T. Mahan (1890, 192).

Technologically backward and facing a more competitive world market, the St. Kitts-Nevis' sugar industry entered a critical period, but continued to command the economy: King Sugar controlled 96.5 percent of the island's total exports in 1894, second to Barbados in the British Caribbean by 0.5 percent (Williams, 1970, 372). In the 1890s the sluggish St. Kitts-Nevis' sugar industry depended on the unreliable U. S. market.

Shipping muscavado sugar and its byproducts was the main task of the U. S. consular legation in St. Kitts. Established in 1875, it was only a commercial agency.[35] In 1890, a merchant of French descent, Emile S. Deslile, attended the consulate. He succeeded his late father in the position and was "thus a diplomat by inheritance" (Mcquade, 1890, 109). The Deslile family had strong trade relations with the United States at least since the 1850s: "Mr. Emile Deslile owned vessels and dispatched them to the United States for cargoes on his own account. He was one of the leading merchants, importing sometimes three times as much in value as his nearest competitors" (Hall, 1985, 138). In the early 1890s, the American citizen Leopold Moore took over as commercial agent; when he died in 1894, vice-commercial agent Lewis H. Percival took charge.[36] In December 1898, commercial agent Hamilton W. Kerr left and Deslile assumed duties again.[37] A year later Dr. Joseph Haven, a physician, was a commercial agent and Deslile vice-commercial agent.[38]

As other U. S. consular officials in the Caribbean, the commercial agents in Basseterre reported on various issues important to the expanding U. S. presence in the region. The dispatches reproduced in the

[35] A commercial agent was "simply a consul of a lower grade and another name." Anguilla had a consulate from 1881 to 1896, and Nevis appears with a consulate in 1900 with Charles S. Greaves as agent. Conner (1900, 47). See "Appendix III: Consular...," in Ulibarri & Harrison (1974, 424) and Conner (1900, 222).

[36] Percival served as U. S. vice-consul in St. Martin from 1878 to 1890 when he moved to St. Kitts. In 1894 he was appointed a vice-commercial agent. Lewis H. Percival to Assistant Secretary of State (1897).

[37] Emile S. Deslile to William R. Day (1899).

[38] In October 1899 the U. S. consulate in the nearby Dutch colony of St. Bartholomew closed, and the Basseterre legation took over matters there. See Joseph Haven to Alvey A. Adee (1899) and Conner (1900, 222). In 1902, a passenger from Liberty, New York in the steamer *Madiana* wrote that when taken ashore "it seems to be beggar's-day in Basseterre, for never we have seen so many beggars who fairly besiege us wherever we go, and although this is a rich island and a fair business town... there is nothing to interest the average tourist here. He added "that Consul Haven and his wife saved them the day by inviting them to the consulate, "a large, cool and cozy house, in which... Americans are often liberally entertained." A. J. D. Wedemeyer, "Cruising in the Tropics," newspaper clipping in Haven to U. S. Department of State (1902).

appendices deal with economic, commercial, social, labor and geopolitical issues; the brief descriptions that follow provide the necessary context for their analysis.[39]

THE SUGAR DEPRESSION

The British Caribbean, which once reigned supreme in the London market, produced less than one tenth of the British total sugar import by the end of the century and "had become the Empire's darkest slum" (Amery, 1951, 235). Bountied European sugar kept British Caribbean colonial sugar out of its metropolitan market.[40] Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, said to be "the only statesman who has ever applied a comprehensive policy for the aid and advancement of the West Indies as a whole," led the fight against European export bounties (Amery, 1951, 250)[41] In 1896, he succeeded in appointing the Norman Commission. The commission diagnosed that the sugar industry in the Caribbean was "in danger of great reduction," even "extinction in some colonies" because of "the competition of beet sugar produced under a system of bounties."[42] It identified St. Kitts-Nevis as one of the colonies where the failure of the industry is "likely to be of serious character," adding that St. Kitts-Nevis and Antigua faced a "more gloomy" future than St. Vincent or St. Lucia. The Committee of the Agricultural Society, a planter's organization in St. Kitts-Nevis, agreed with that conclusion and worried about the closing of the U. S. market:

> the sugar industry is on the point of extinction... the only markets for the muscavado sugar produced... are the United States and Canada, and it seems that... the United States will be closed to us, as the import duties which it is

[39] Dispatch I (1897), a report on the sugar depression, is placed first because it serves as background to the labor troubles described in Dispatch II (1896).

[40] Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany and Russia gave bonuses to their producers of beet sugar for export, known as bounties. These subsidies enabled the industry to grow and to sell beet sugar cheaper than British Caribbean cane sugar in Britain's and in the world market. For further details see Ph. G. Chalmin (1984, 9-19) and J. H. Galloway (1989, 131-134).

[41] Chamberlain was cognizant of conditions in the British Caribbean, more so when his son Neville, the future Prime Minister (1937-1940), wrote to him that year that the failure of their sisal plantation in Andros in the Bahamian archipelago was "*my* failure." Keith Feiling (1946, 29) (Italics in the original). Our thanks to Dr. Juan Giusti for telling us that Neville Chamberlain had lived in the Bahamas.

[42] *Report of the West India Royal Commission* (1897, 69).

> intended to impose on sugar, for the purpose of fostering the home-grown article, will prevent the importation of sugar.[43]

Chamberlain rejected initially most of the Norman Commission's recommendations, but supported the abolition of bounties and the establishment of a department of economic botany, later renamed the Imperial Department of Agriculture of the West Indies (Will, 1970, 137-140). The Imperial Department of Agriculture of the West Indies, established in 1898, supported the experiments on cane varieties taking place in Barbados and British Guiana (Galloway, 1996; García Muñiz, 1997). An agricultural school was established in St. Kitts.

In 1903 Great Britain pushed for the approval of the Brussels Convention that abolished bounties in Germany and France. Cane sugar regained its predominance in the world market, but British Caribbean sugar provided still only around one percent of Great Britain's raw sugar imports (Saul, 1957, 179-180).

British private investors were not attracted to the sugar industry of the Leeward Islands. In 1899 Joseph Chamberlain's efforts to convince the self-made millionaire merchant Richard Lipton to invest in central factories in Barbados, Antigua and St. Kitts ended in failure (Kubicek, 1969, 126-127). Imperial aid to meet the emergency caused by the sugar depression and hurricanes came in the manner of grants-in-aid (Kubicek, 1969, 85-88).

A real stimulus for the British Caribbean sugar industry came when Canada changed tariffs to give preference to British sugar. Canadian preference prevented "the entrance of the West Indian colonies into a 'Yankee' *Zollverein* which might have been the step to complete union since the British West Indies would not have the resistive power to withstand the pull of 'The States' " (Beachy, 1957, 172).[44]

The U. S. market for St. Kitts-Nevis, and for other British Caribbean muscavado sugar producers, was closing as the refineries of the American Sugar Refining Company (known as the Sugar Trust) required 96

[43] The Committee of the Agricultural Society, "Memorandum," *Report of the West India Royal Commission, Appendix C, Vol. III, Part III. St. Kitts-Nevis* (1897, 209). Canada was not exactly the best buyer: "To ship sugar to Canada was a policy of desperation, as prices were usually lowest of all there." Alan Furness (1961, 48).

[44] The renowned Dutch sugar specialist H. C. Prinsen Geerlings wrote: "The British Government... was fain to see the West Indian colonists content and well at ease, for fear they should otherwise wish to be incorporated into the United States." H. C. Prinsen Geerlings (1912, 205).

degree raw sugars. Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Cuba (with a 20 percent preferential rate) and U. S. cane and beet sugar producers controlled the U. S. market. British capital invested again in the sugar industry in the Caribbean, particularly in the building of central factories. In St. Kitts, London-based Henckell, Du Boisson & Co. built a central factory in Basseterre in 1912.[45]

The trade diversion of sugar to Canada did not mean that the United States lost its economic interest in the British Caribbean. American-owned United Fruit Co. controlled most of the banana trade and attempts by Chamberlain to provide a counterweight proved futile (Saul, 1957, 180-181). By the start of World War I, Jamaica was the world's largest exporter of bananas, sending most to Boston, a connection that started in 1870.[46] Shortly after U. S. economic interests conjoined with strategic ones as North American investors dominated bauxite and petroleum production in the British and Dutch Caribbean.

In Dispatch I (1897) the U. S. Commercial Agent Lewis H. Percival discussed the depression affecting the St. Kitts-Nevis sugar industry in 1897, before the arrival of the Norman Commission. Percival informed succinctly about the ill-effects of the bounty system in the British Caribbean sugar colonies, specifically on the planters and the laboring class.

Labor Turmoil

Labor turmoil was not new in St. Kitts-Nevis. Immediately after abolition in 1833, the colonial government declared martial law in the face of an extensive walkout from the plantations to the mountains by the former slaves (Frucht, 1975, 199-214). Ex-slaves refused to work without wages under the apprenticeship system (1834-1838). During the post-emancipation period conflicts among planters and workers continued, more so as sugar entered into a period of decline going into the 1890s, as shown in Dispatch I (1897). Planters in St. Kitts held a strong position, with no reserves of Crown land available and the prohibition of cultivation in the central mountain range because of soil conservation. The 'free village'

[45] The company owned the St. Madeleine Sugar Factory in Trinidad, the Antigua Sugar Factory in Antigua, and the Grays Inn Sugar Factory in Jamaica. See Glen Richards (1989, 15).

[46] For an inventory of U. S. investments in the British Caribbean just before World War I see Frederic M. Halsey (1918).

system did not develop as it did in Jamaica, British Guiana or in nearby Antigua. Sugar laborers had no choice but to live and work on the plantation at wage levels set by the planter. St. Kittian historian Glen Richards argues conclusively that

> the absence of alternatives to plantation labour meant that St. Kitts ex-slaves had in fact been proletarianized to a greater degree than the ex-slaves of other British West Indian colonies like Jamaica or Trinidad (Richards, 1995, 278).

Dispatch II (1896) was a detailed consular narrative of a spontaneous general strike in St. Kitts, the first such experience endured by the sugar industry in the island and possibly in the Caribbean.[47] The communiqué circumscribed its description to St. Kitts as seemingly the disturbances did not extend to Nevis.[48]

The other early general cane strike in the Caribbean took place in Martinique in 1900, where back in 1844-45 the first central factories were built in the region (Adélaide-Merlande, 1972; Schnakenbourg, 1982, 86-98; Nicolas, 1996, 156-162). An influential French newspaper sensationalized the strike by linking it to ongoing U. S. expansionist activities in the Caribbean, now directed to the French colonies. *The Figaro* charged the United States of "secretly fomenting the insurrection in order to assert herself with a view of taking the islands from France eventually."[49] According to *The New York Times*, the French newspaper said that

> the negroes of Martinique hope to imitate their brethren of Santo Domingo, and that the United States, which already exercises a dissimulated protectorate over Santo Domingo, would not be sorry to see them follow the same road...[50]

The Figaro asserted that "colored emissaries" paid by the United States had been working for years past to undermine French influence in

[47] For a social and cultural analysis see Richards (1989, 145-152).

[48] Abolition hit Nevisian sugar industry harder than St. Kitts. Plantation agriculture almost disappeared in Nevis by the end of the century as sugar estates were broken up and sold in small lots. The smallness of the island and poor quality soil blocked the possibility of building a central factory. Peasant- and sharecropper-based agriculture (sugar, food crops, sea island cotton) made "the conditions of the people of Nevis happier." *Report of the West India Royal Commission* (1897, 57). See Gordon C. Merrill (1958, 112-120) and J. H. Galloway (1989, 155).

[49] *The New York Times* (18 February 1900, 7).

[50] *The New York Times* (25 February 1900, 7).

Martinique and Guadeloupe but "the movement had taken an acute form since the American acquisition of Puerto Rico.[51]

Deputies of Martinique in the Chamber of Deputies, generally not supportive of the French government, flatly denied the accusations. No evidence has been found linking the United States with the strikes, but the prevailing expanding atmosphere that envisioned a hegemonic United States in the region impelled *The New York Times* to editorialize that

> if we do as well with Cuba and Puerto Rico as we are hoping and promising to do, it seems likely that Martinique would prove a more profitable possession to us than to the present owner.[52]

Just as in the St. Kitts-Nevis labor turmoil, the specter of "another Haiti" syndrome emerged in the Martinique case (Maingot, 1993). *The New York Times* headlined "Negroes Threaten Whites."[53] The newspaper editorialized that in Haiti "the blacks... won for themselves the freedom which they have ever since been engaged in showing that they do not know how to use."[54]

The next general sugar strike in the Caribbean erupted in Puerto Rico in 1905 and, like in St. Kitts-Nevis and Martinique, the colonial authorities repressed strikers with security forces (Ramos Mattei, 1988, 115-128; Córdova Iturregui, 1990). The main leader of the Federation of Free Workingmen, Spanish-born Santiago Iglesias, aimed to defeat the largest sugar company in Puerto Rico, U. S.-owned Guanica Centrale (García Muñiz, 1997, 510-515). He failed, with Guanica Centrale even refusing to negotiate with the trade union. That year serious labor disturbances and riots took place in British Guiana, but they were not union-based (Rodney, 1981, 190-216; Hart, 1988, 43-79).

No other dispatches on labor issues were found, but two communiqués addressed the emigration of "colored persons, native West Indians" to the United States.[55] Several emigrants experienced difficulties on their return because they did not bring proof of citizenship. One such case was Manuel Evans, who went from Texas to Puerto Rico in the

[51] *The New York Times* (18 February 1900, 7).
[52] *The New York Times* (20 February 1900, 6).
[53] *The New York Times* (13 February 1900, 2).
[54] *The New York Times* (20 February 1900, 6).
[55] Joseph Haven to Herbert H. D. Peirce (1904). For an analysis of St. Kitts' migration patterns see Bonham C. Richardson (1983).

employ of the U. S. government as a muleteer during the 1898 war and was working presently for the Ponce Railway and Light Co. Already Dispatch I (1897) had noted that in the face of the crisis, emigration was an alternative to starvation. Between 1891 and 1921, the total population of St. Kitts dropped from 30 876 to 22 415, while that of Nevis fell from 13 087 to 11 569 (Richards, 1995, 282).

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

The war of 1898 established the fighting power of the U. S. Navy in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The acquisition of bases in both regions was another important result of the conflict, followed by U. S. sole control of the isthmian canal. A naval build-up came as a direct consequence. The new century found Great Britain without the resources to battle its possible enemies simultaneously in various fronts, particularly at home and in North America.

American and British policymakers coincided that the British Caribbean was within the U. S. geopolitical sphere of influence. Great Britain recognized that the security of its Caribbean colonies had for all practical purposes fallen to the growing U. S. Navy. The Caribbean became peripheral to Britain's security. Consequently its strategic retrenchment from the Caribbean moved apace, while it strengthened its position in European waters. In 1901 the Admiralty expressed clearly the dilemma to the Foreign Office:

> Great Britain unaided can hardly expect to be able to maintain in the West Indies, the Pacific, and in the North American stations, squadrons sufficiently powerful to dominate those of the United States and at the same time to hold the command of the sea and home waters, the Mediterranean, and the Eastern seas where it is essential that she should remain predominant.[56]

Anglo-American *rapprochement* grew stronger, with Britain ceding hemispheric supremacy to the United States. In 1904 Britain backed the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which meant United States intervention to prevent European intervention. The damage-control resolution by both powers of the 1907 Jamaica incident proved that

[56] Quoted in Friedberg (1988, 171).

Theodore Roosevelt "perceive[d] the existence of these 'local' British colonies as fully in harmony with the interest of the United States" (Tilchin, 1995, 403).

The war of 1898 was also a watershed for U. S. capital in the Caribbean. In 1897 U. S. direct investment in the Caribbean (including Central America) totaled only about $60 million, less than in Mexico, Canada or Europe (Wilkins, 1970, 153). Despite the proximity and potentialities of the region, the low investment is explained by the colonial status of most Caribbean territories, the small size of the markets, political instability, and U. S. legislation.

After the war, U. S. capital moved swiftly into commercial agriculture, mining, railroads and utilities, particularly in Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and Puerto Rico (Wilkins, 1970, Chapter 8; Ramos Mattei, 1974 and Pino Santos, 1975). Small producers expressed greater interest in the consular function of trade expansion. Dispatch III (1902) was a report of the U. S. consular legation in St. Kitts-Nevis (under pressure by the "commercial expansionists") on the present economic condition and future prospects.[57] It showed the frantic search for buyers by U. S. companies in the early 1900s trying to sell in such small markets as St. Kitts and Nevis, which in 1897 had an estimated population of 31 900 and 13 700, respectively.

Dispatch III (1902) and Dispatch V (1903) mention several products, including sea island cotton, that would diversify the one-crop economy of the island. The cotton project involved the newly established Imperial Department of Agriculture, under Dr. Daniel Morris. These projects turned out to be a fiasco. "A caterpillar that eats the leaf" attacked cotton and it failed to develop into a major industry.[58] Dispatch V (1903) noted also Nevis' possibilities as winter health resort. By this time the American tourist had discovered the Bahamas, Barbados and Jamaica. Bahamas' Royal Victorian Hotel opened in 1861, Barbados' Crane Beach in 1887, and Jamaica's Titchfield Hotel in the mid-1890s (Taylor, 1993, 46).

In Dispatches IV and V, both dated 1903, U. S. Commercial Agent Dr. Joseph Haven, while expressing his eagerness for the acquisition of St. Kitts by the United States, noted Anglo-Saxonism, the presence of the U. S. Navy, and the negotiations with Denmark for St. Thomas (Orde, 1996, 28-32). The agitation in favor of Anglo-American friendship gen-

[57] "Commercial expansionists" refer to both the import and export trades. See Fletcher (1984, 123-124).

[58] *Agricultural News* (1903, 330). See also Merrill (1958, 119-120).

erated, in both countries, many associations promoting 'Anglo-Saxon unity.' Joseph Chamberlain figured as one of the most notable advocates of Anglo-American friendship, going as far as to propose an alliance. With "Anglo-Saxon" used interchangeably with "English-speaking," Dr. Haven pushed further his case by noting that "English is spoken" in St. Kitts and Nevis.[59] A noticeable omission in Dispatch V (1903) was the linkage of Anglo-Saxonism with race, particularly when "the White Man's Burden" was an important tenet in the imperialist ideology of all major powers, including the United States, at the turn the century (Weinberg, 1935, Chapter X, and Horsman, 1981).

The U. S. Navy made routine visits to Caribbean ports, sometimes just for "showing the flag" or to survey a particular site. One of the main tasks of the consular officers was the promotion of the U. S. Navy. They were "expected to advance the interests of the U. S. Navy socially and otherwise whenever they can do so without expense to the Government" (Conner, 1900, 50-51). The U. S. consular officials in the Caribbean strongly supported the U. S. Navy, which was "in the process of turning the Caribbean into an American lake" (Challener, 1973, 110).

The war of 1898 whetted U. S. proclivities for acquiring certain Caribbean territories. Dr. Haven noticed the ongoing negotiations with Denmark for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, a long-standing interest of the United States dating to the end of the Civil War. Negotiations failed when the Danish Landsthing did not approve the cession bill. Naval officers, including Mahan, pointed out consistently the strategic value of St. Thomas for an isthmian canal.[60] At last, in 1917, the United States purchased the Danish West Indies for $25 million.[61] St. Thomas was a successful instance of "preclusive imperialism," a case where U. S. action preempted any damage coming from European intervention, such as the acquisition of these islands by Germany.[62]

[59] A few years earlier, General James Mcquade commented on the language: "They speak English in a sort of gibberish, difficult to be understood by those unfamiliar with the *patois*. The Basse-Terre dialect is a sort of Basseterre English." Mcquade (1900, 115) (Italics in the original).

[60] That year, Ellen C. Semple, the American disciple and popularizer of German geopolitician Friedrich Ratzel, wrote: "The possession of St. Thomas will give us control of the Anegada Passage, the doorway for most of the steamship lines from Europe and the last important channel into this sea from the North." See Ellen C. Semple (1903, 409).

[61] Secretary of State Robert Lansing moved swiftly out of fear that the islands would be an asset to Germany as a submarine base. See Charles C. Tansill (1932).

[62] William L. Langer coined the term "preclusive imperialism" for the post-1870

Dispatch V (1905) is the U. S. Commercial Agent's prospectus for the acquisition by transfer or purchase of St. Kitts by the United States. Dr. Haven submitted it to the Third Assistant Secretary of State, an office held in 1903 by Herbert H. D. Peirce, who "occupied a special position within the Department" (Crane, 1960, 90). Peirce was a brother-in-law of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and had personal contact with President Theodore Roosevelt.[63] Dr. Haven broached the subject to the official in the Department of State with the right connections and probably the right mentality to pursue the matter further, if it so merited.

Dr. Haven's proposal fell on deaf ears. No reference to it is found in the literature. The times had turned unauspicious. That same year, in 1903, the frenzy of the General Board of the U. S. Navy for an extensive Caribbean chain of naval bases and coaling stations to protect an isthmian canal had subsided.[64] The proposal came in the wake of the crisis sparked by Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela, by which the United States asserted its military hegemony in the region. Probably it was one of many rejected propositions of sites for bases presented by the American diplomatic officers, particularly those in Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, in 1898, the United States did not flinch when its consul in Santo Domingo urged the seizure of Samaná Bay, reportedly at the urging of President Ulises Heureaux (Challener, 1973, 123). Dispatch V (1903), as far as we are aware, is the first proposal by a U. S. consul for the outright acquisition of a British Caribbean colony.

U. S. interest in British Caribbean colonies recessed until 1917 when World War I brought out again their strategic value and prime location in strategic and commercial routes, causing a renewal of the calls for their acquisition (Joseph, 1973, 45-46). During the postwar period, the rejection of the League of Nations by the United States meant the crumbling

---

European expansion and Richard Challener applied it to the "hypothetical dangers in the Caribbean" seen by the United States at the turn of the century. Richard Challener (1973, 68). For a critical analysis of the alleged German threat in the Caribbean to the United States see Nancy Mitchell (1996).

[63] In 1901 Peirce served as secretary of the U. S. embassy at St. Petersburg when he was appointed Third Secretary in the Department of State at the request of Cabot Lodge. Roosevelt entrusted him with the inspection of several consulates in China and other eastern seaports in order to forestall any political fallout of the consuls' misbehavior. See Crane (1960, 90) and Graham M. Stuart (1949, 195).

[64] Congressional reluctance to appropriate funds, the emergence of the fleet collier, and the capability of the battle fleet also were mentioned. See Challener (1973, 37-42) and David Healy (1988, 97-99).

of the Anglo-American alliance. American economic power had enormous influence in the international economy, while domestic considerations restrained its political power. In 1921 suggestions were made that Britain give up Canada and the British Caribbean to regain U. S. confidence (Orde, 1996, 74). In 1928 an American writer Ludwell Denny suggested that a compromise to end the contest between these two great economic empires must include

> a free hand for the United States in Latin America with Great Britain ultimately to get out of British Honduras and Jamaica and immediately stop concession-hunting in Panaman *[sic]*, Colombian and other territory commanding the Panama Canal [Orde, 1996, 95-96].

With the nearing of World War II, calls for the acquisition of European colonies in the Caribbean reappeared in the United States. In 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt signed the destroyers-for-bases agreement, by which Great Britain received fifty reconstructed destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases of air and naval installations in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana (André Baptiste, 1988).[65] U. S. military troops were stationed in Aruba, Curaçao, Suriname and French Guiana, and also in the sovereign states of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The United States waited almost a quarter of a century before placing a military presence not only in the British Caribbean colonies, but also in the Dutch and French Caribbean possessions (García Muñiz, 1988, Chapter 2). U. S. military installations and troops were already in place in Cuba and Puerto Rico, but its larger presence remained at the foundation of its Caribbean security policy, Panama.

[65] Economics and race surfaced as important factors in favor of leasing of bases and not in the transferral of the territories to the United States. President Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull: "If we can get our naval bases why, for example, should we buy with them two million headaches, consisting of that number of human beings who would be a definite economic drag on this country, and who would stir up questions of racial stocks by virtue of their new status as American citizens?" Eric Williams (n.d., 196).

Conclusion

The Caribbean is the area of closest and most prolonged contact between American commercial and security interests. By promoting both, U. S. consular officials in the Caribbean advanced U. S. hegemony in the region. In the nineteenth century, consular officers played an important role in the formulation of a geopolitical conception of the Caribbean in the U. S. diplomatic, commercial and military policymaking circles. As the century wore on, the consular officers themselves, influenced by the same conception their predecessors contributed to create, fostered U. S. security by pushing for U. S. economic and military ascendancy in the region. Their commercial and political/diplomatic roles prompted their contact with U. S. industrials and merchants as well as with U. S. naval personnel. The U. S. consular body served as the nexus between these two potent U. S. forces that matured in the second half of the nineteenth century. During the last decades of the century both forces moved forcefully into the Caribbean, with the war against in Spain in 1898 and the building of the isthmian canal starting in 1904.

Consular officials performed important functions in the military conquest by the United States of the remaining Spanish colonial empire — Cuba and Puerto Rico — in the Western Hemisphere, U. S. trade and investment in the Caribbean, described as "informal" for most of the nineteenth century, became formal with the acquisition of a territorial empire in 1898. As shown in the consular correspondence presented here, these officials attempted to influence U. S. official policy towards gaining full control of much smaller European colonies in the Caribbean, a role they had performed already by promoting the annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the U. S. decision-making circles.

The year of 1898 has special significance in the historiography of the Caribbean and of the United States. It marked the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent regional power and as a world power, with concrete economic and security interests and commitments in the Western Hemisphere and in Asia. U. S. expansionism was always imperialist because it envisaged the acquisition of extra-continental territory, particularly in the Caribbean. The plantation-dominated Caribbean became an early trade partner of the thirteen North American colonies and remained as such linked to the young and developing United States. The development of U. S. industrial economy, finance capital and naval power in the seventies, eighties and nineties energized commercial links

and brought about U. S. direct investments into the region. Acces to the U. S. market strengthened the bussines alliances between Caribbean producers and merchants with U. S. commercial, industrials and financial concerns. These business alliances served as an important element of the social basis for annexxationism on the Caribbean side. In their intermediary role, consular officials were an important link in the commercial-cum-political connection.

Despite Anglo-American *rapprochement* and U. S. military supremacy in the region, Great Britain was reluctant to lose its economic position in the Caribbean, more so in its colonies. The St. Kitts' sugar connection to the U. S. market led to the familiar U. S. consular proposition of promoting acquisition, within the context of close commercial connections and geopolitical value. But with its short-lived "constructive imperialism," Great Britain diverged the sugar trade towards Canada and reaffirmed its imperial dominion over its colony. For the time being, the United States lost in its attempt to displace British dominance from St. Kitts-Nevis while allowing formal imperial control.

HUMBERTO GARCÍA MUÑIZ
JOSÉ LEE BORGES
E-mail: hgarcia@rrpac.upr.clu.edu

ANEXES

DISPATCH I (1897)[66]
(Excerpt)

No. 57
Commercial Agency of the United States,
St. Christopher, W.I., Feb. 13th, 1897
Honorable William W. Rockhill
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

In view of the present great depression in the Sugar Industry throughout the West Indies, but in this Island in particular, I have thought that the following information relative there to might be specially, if not generally, interesting.

As is well known, the bounty system of certain European Governments, calculated to foster the manufacture of beet sugar, has tended to bring about, gradually, the depression referred to, until at last the planters of sugar cane see and feel that the time is near at hand when the death-stroke will be given, and their only industry be in utter collapse.

With this gloomy state of things in view, some of the owners of plantations in this Island living in the United Kingdom, having other resources to fall back upon, and capitalist making advances to certain planter against the yield of their crops, have deemed it in their interest to stop supplies, with the result that cane cultivation on the following nine estates (plantations) will cease directly the present crop has been harvested, viz.

'Cranstouns'
'Caines's'
'Cunningham'
'Lavington's'
'Fountain'

[66] Lewis H. Percival to William W. Rockhill (1897).

'Saddlers'
'Harris's'
'Pinneys'
in Nevis
and 'Clarkes'

What this must mean to the laboring class, depending for daily bread on the only industry of consequence which the Island affords, can be better imagined than described. That the pinch is already felt is certain, and if the cessation of work, or abandonment, which obtains at present, continues to be the order of the day, the poor laborer must soon see staring him in the face, starvation or emigration.

It has been argued by some, that the owner, or those advancing funds to the owners, of the plantations mentioned, have made a mistake which they will regret later on, from the fact that the properties will become at last utterly valueless; but when on the other hand, one is told, that to manufacture a hogshead of sugar the cost, all told runs up from £7 to £9, or $33.60 to $43.20, while the net result of the sale of a hogshead in the best paying market, shows but the equivalent of the cost of manufacture, and in some cases, owing to special conditions such as: the limited areas under cultivation with almost the same current expenses as a larger plantation; the yield of the land; carriage; the kind of machinery employed, re _ a deficit of more or less, £2.10.0 = $12.00, it is not to be wondered at that the knife once and for all has been put to the root of the cane plant, at least as far as their special plantations are concerned.

In a casual manner it recently came to my knowledge that for the upkeep of a certain plantation for the past year, bills of exchange to the extent of some £2400 = $11 520.00 had been drawn on the owners or capitalists in England, while the net proceeds of the sugar, rum, re, obtained during that year, failed to cover even the one half of the advance referred to. Such a state of things, such conditions, if resulting from drought [illegible] might be a chance of improvement in the future, but where the cause is that insuperable obstacle — the bounty on beet sugar in Europe, little hope can be entertained for amelioration.

Those who still go on with the cultivation of the cane do so in the hope that something unforeseen will turn up by which their industry will gain new vigor they [illegible] the evil day as long as they possibly can. Reports to the Mother Country on the state of affairs have not been

lacking, and have had the effect of causing an investigating commission to be appointed.

.....

I am, Sir
Your obedient servant
Lewis H. Percival
U. S. Vice-Commercial Agent

DISPATCH II (1896)[67]

No. 38
Commercial Agency of the United States,
St. Christopher, W.I., Feby 24th, 1896
Honorable Edwin Uhl
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

I have the honor to make the following report in reference to labor trouble now going on in this island.

At the beginning of the harvesting of the sugar crop about 6 months ago, the laborers on the various estates struck for increase of wages, their wage having been reduced last year owing to the low price of sugar and the short crop in the island.

In some instances the wages were advanced but where they were not the men began to set fire to the canes and night after night cane fields were destroyed by fire, the authorities doing nothing to prevent these fires claiming they were powerless to do so.

The managers of the various estates increased the men wages with very little beneficial result, as the spirit of disaffection continue to prevail among the laborers and they continued to demand a still further increase and when it was not at once granted, they burned the cane fields and struck work.

Things went from bad to worse when last Monday (Feby 17th) the boat men struck and refused to permit any small boat to go off to any vessel in the harbor. They behaved in a most disorderly manner all day continually blowing the 'shell' (a sort of horn made from a shell which means open defiance to the law) and acted in a riotous manner generally.

[67] Leopold Moore to Edwin Uhl (1896).

They were joined from time to time during the day by gangs of laborers from the estates marching in on the town from the country armed with sticks and stones lo to the tunes of their own native music. Fortunately earlier in the day H.M.S. [illegible] arrive in the harbor on tour of inspection and remained intending leaving the following day.

Toward 3 0'0 in the afternoon reports came in to the effect that rioting was going on at Old Road (a place about 6 miles from town) and at 5 0'0 the administrator sent off official notice to the War vessel to land 40 Marines and blue jacket down at Old Road which was immediately done.

About 70'0 in the evening the mob began to march through the streets throwing stones and smashing windows of the houses and stores as they went along and later on broke all the street lamps leaving the town in almost total darkness. Toward 9 0'0 they broke into the provisions stores and saloons and a general looting took place, the [illegible] then landed a few more men and the row at Old Road not being as bad as it was represented, the Marines were quickly ordered up to town and after some skirmishing in which 3 black rioters were killed and several wounded partial order was restored.

Fourteen (14) stores in all were looted and four destroyed and taken by the mob is estimated at about $5000.00.

Several attempts were made to fire the town but the Marines quickly extinguished the flames. The Governor was telegraphed for and arrived the following day from Antigua, and it was decided that the War Ship should remain for the present as the island certainly would not be safe without some protection, for the blacks are still going around making threats to burn the town and murder the white people at the first opportunity.

The island is now under martial law and no one is allowed out after sunset.

It is the unanimous opinion of both whites and blacks that had not the [illegible] been in the harbor or had the rioting began a day sooner or been deferred a day later the town must have been destroyed and that few of the white people would have escaped with their lives.

My own opinion is that the worst is now over.
I am Sir
Your obedient servant
Leopold Moore
Commercial Agent

DISPATCH III (1902)[68]
(Excerpt)

No. 65
Commercial Agency of the United States,
St. Christopher, W.I., July 26th, 1902
Honorable Herbert H. D. Peirce
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

...These islands [Leeward and Windward] each enjoy the somewhat unique position of belonging nominally to one country but geographically and politically and financially to another. Keeping strictly within my own territory it is still fair to suppose that St. Kitts and Nevis represent typical conditions existing all through this chain of islands.

Their production, sugar, until very recently finding equal inducement, has naturally sought the nearest market — New York. Being obliged to pay a corresponding duty upon importations from the Mother Country, has naturally opened the way, nay even invited, the large importation of American goods now extant.

Natural loyalty for the home country and the conservatism of the West Indian have been obliged to step one side before the paramount question of dollars and cents. To be sure the sugar market for obvious reasons seems likely now to be deflected elsewhere but the events now fast crowding upon us namely the United States accession of Porto Rico and probable accession of the Danish West Indies. The independence of Cuba and the Isthmian Canal all unite to warrant a great increase of trade with the United States.

Already business houses all over the country are inquiring as to the probability of a market for their American goods. Syndicates are sending agents to determine the advisability of establishment of plants of one kind or another so that it is possible that the Cane Sugar, crippled by the beet-root, may find a rival in cotton, coffee, cocoa, etc. and the sugar factory have for neighbors the tobacco factory and establishments for the manufacture of prepared fruits and desiccated vegetables.

[68] Joseph Haven to Herbert H. D. Peirce (1902).

Already we are assured of the establishment in St. Kitts of a plant for the manufacture of banana products upon a large scale, namely, banana coffee, banana flour and desiccated bananas.

.....

Your obedient servant,
Joseph Haven,
Commercial Agent

DISPATCH IV (1903)[69]
(Excerpt)

No. 84
Commercial Agency of the United States
St. Christopher, February 18th, 1903
Honorable Herbert H. D. Peirce
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith... newspapers notices of the visit of the U. S. fleets to St. Kitts during January and February and to say in the same connection that as a result of said visit the American feeling is boundless and expressions of 'Anglo Saxon unity' , 'Brotherhood', etc. are common. I have been repeatedly been asked of late if there was a chance of the United States buying St. Kitts. Admiral Higginson expressed great surprise at the anchorage possibilities for a large fleet, "the only open roadstead, fifty-vessels could find good anchorage in the bay."

I have the honor to be, Sir
Your obedient servant
Joseph Haven
U. S. Commercial Agent

[69] Joseph Haven to Herbert H. D. Peirce (1903).

DISPATCH V (1903)[70]

No. 103
Commercial Agency of the United States,
St. Christopher, West Indies, July 20 1903.
Honorable Herbert H. D. Peirce,
Third Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

Although not an expansionist merely for territory, never the less during my four years residence on this island, I have had a growing conviction that the islands of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis should belong to the United States, particularly if the Danish West Indies transfer does not materialize.

While it may appear little presumptuous on my part, yet I trust I may be pardoned for calling the attention of the Department to a few of the advantages possessed by these islands, which might be worth considering should an opportunity for exchange of territory, or purchase arise.

St. Kitts as a port of call

First, The position of these islands in relation to an Isthmian Canal. St. Kitts lying in a direct track of vessels from the Pacific, bound for Mediterranean ports and Europe could be made an important port of call.

Second, Their position in relation to Porto Rico.

Porto Rico lies in the direct line of travel of many steamers from Trinidad and Barbados which make St. Kitts their last port of call going North. The Canadian Mail steamers all call at St. Kitts as do the Quebec line to New York. The Armstrong line from Halifax and the Scrutton line from Europe direct make this the first port of call. These all pass Porto Rico. Then there is the Royal Mail service with its terminus at St. Thomas 350 steamers were entered and cleared from St. Kitts last year, an average of nearly one a day, showing its importance even now as a port of call.

St. Kitts as a rendezvous station

While St. Kitts possesses only an open bay or road stead, yet it is entered without difficulty and the anchorage is excellent (see report forwarded June 30th last 'Harbor and River Improvement')

[70] Joseph Haven to Herbert H. D. Peirce (1903).

A great bay is formed by a peninsular or neck of St. Kitts extending to the South and continued by the island of Nevis (a narrow channel lying between) and a projecting point to the West of Basseterre called "The Fort" (an old fortification). This forms a bit of coast strikingly like the bay of Naples. The town of Basseterre lying relatively with Naples and Ben Nevis corresponding with Vesuvius. The island of Capri only being needed to complete the similarity.

Admiral Higginson said at a banquet given here last winter to the North Atlantic Squadron, 'A hundred battle ships could find good anchorage in your bay.'

The old fortification on the summit of Brimstone Hill, a veritable Gibraltar, command the channel between St. Kitts and St. Eustatius and Saba, both islands but a few miles distant.

Roads. A wide and well kept road follows the sea entirely around the island, a distance of 30 miles. The roads of Nevis are good.

Water supply. The water supply is unusually good. Coming from the mountains clear and cold it is piped from the reservoirs part way down. The supply is abundant most of the year, in dry seasons the water is sometimes locked off for a part of the day but properly constructed reservoirs would probably obviate this necessity. The wells and cisterns of old days before the water source was established are said to have given very good water.

The hot sulphur springs of Nevis were once famous. With capital and enterprise Nevis could be made a winter health resort. Its historic name making it already world known.

Coaling facilities. St. Kitts is not a coaling station. Whether it could be made so is a question for engineers to answer. There is level ground enough for any extent of buildings and yardroom adjoining the bay at Basseterre. There is no tide and the sea seldom runs high.

Health. St Kitts is one of the healthiest places I know of (speaking as a physician myself.) During my residence of four years there has not been a single epidemic disease. We have a leper colony it is true but the Lazaretto is well managed, as is also general hospital.

Climate. The average temperature is about 80 degrees, given to very slight changes, some humidity. Trade winds constantly for nine months of the year. That St. Kitts lies in the hurricane track is its misfortune, but these visitations are not of frequent occurrence.

St. Kitts valued from commercial standpoint

For productive possibilities, St. Kitts may have its equal but it would be hard to imagine its superior.

Soil and climate vie with each other to produce successive crops as fast as they can be taken care of.

Sugar manufacture has erstwhile been the great industry of the island but as this commodity is forced out of the market by existing circumstances, cotton is coming to take its place. Tobacco is being tried with good results, but it is *cotton* that is going to be king here and I predict that in a few years St. Kitts and Nevis will be the greatest exporters of sea island cotton in the world, in proportion to their size (see my trade and commerce report June 30th 1903) The planters have not yet awakened to the full possibilities of this industry, being loath to give up sugar, but it is bound to come, and cotton will stay.

It is this foreshadowing of the future that prompts me to forward this communication at the present time.

There are of course possibilities of many other kinds of industries. Fruit and vegetables might be said to grow 'while you wait' . Pasturage is sufficient for cattle necessary for home consumption.

The salt ponds when worked produce large quantities of salt but there is little profit in salt.

In my trade report for 1901 I gave more detailed description of St. Kitts.

The islands of St. Kitts and Nevis are English and only English is spoken while the people are loyal to their mother country, their eyes at present are turned to the United States, like the Mohammedans to Mecca, in prayer. When England takes their cotton it may be different.

My peculiarly pleasant relations with the Government, planters and all classes of people on these Islands have made it possible for me to become thoroughly conversant with West Indian life past and present. Trusting that in my zeal I have not overstepped the bounds in this communication.

I am Sir,
Your obedient servant
Joseph Haven
Commercial Agent

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acosta, José Julián
1866 "Notas" to fray Iñigo Abad, *Historia geográfica, civil y natural de la isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico,* Puerto Rico, Imprenta y librería Acosta.

Adams, Brooks
1900 *America's economic supremacy,* reprint, New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947.

Adélaide-Merlande, Jacques
1972 *Les origines du mouvement ouvrier à la Martinique, de 1870 a la grève de Février 1900,* Guyane, Centre D'Études Regionales Antilles-Guyane (Les cahiers du CERAG, no. 26).

Agricultural News (Barbados)
1903 "The cotton worm," 2, no. 39, 10 October, 330.

Amery, Julian
1951 *The life of Joseph Chamberlain,* vol. 4, *1901-1903 at the Height Of His Power,* London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

Baptiste, Fitzroy André
1988 *War, cooperation and conflict: the European possessions in the Caribbean, 1939-1945,* New York, Greenwood Press. Beachey, R. W.
1957 *The West Indian sugar industry in the late 19th century,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Beale, Howard K.
1956 *Theodore Roosevelt and the rise of America to world power,* Baltimore.

Beachy, R.W.
1957 *The British West Indies sugar industry in the late 19th century.*

Becker, William H.
1982 *The dynamics of business-government relations,* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Benns, F. Lee
1923 *The American struggle for the British West India carrying trade 1815-1830,* reprint, Clifton, N.J., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972.

Bergad, Laird
1988 "¿Dos alas del mismo pájaro? Notas para la historia socioeconómica comparativa de Cuba y Puerto Rico," *Historia y Sociedad,* año I, 143-153.

Betances, R. E.
1884 "Una colonia en la bahía de Samaná," in Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Samaná, pasado y porvenir,* 2nd. ed., aum., Santo Domingo, Editora del Caribe, 1973.

Bryan, Patrick
1991 *The Jamaican people 1880-1902: race, class and social control,* London, Macmillan Caribbean.

Burns, Sir Alan
1965 *History of the British West Indies*, rev. 2nd. ed., London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Callcott, Wilfrid H.
1942 *The Caribbean policy of the United States, 1890-1920*, reprint, New York, Octagon Books, 1977.
Centro de Investigaciones Históricas
1982 *Despachos de los cónsules norteamericanos en Puerto Rico (1818-1898)*, Río Piedras, Editorial Universitaria.
Challener, Richard
1973 *Admirals, generals and American foreign policy 1898-1914*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Chalmin, Ph. G.
1984 "The important trends in sugar diplomacy before 1914," in Bill Albert & Adrian Graves, eds., *Crisis and change in the international sugar economy 1860-1914*, Norwich & Edinburgh, ISC Press.
Coatsworth, John H.
1967 "American trade with European colonies in the Caribbean and South America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 24, no. 4, 243-265.
Conner, J. E.
1900 *Uncle Sam abroad*, Chicago, Rand, McNally & Co.
Cordova Iturregui, Félix
1990 "Las huelgas azucareras del 1905," Paper Presented in the Encuentro de Historiadores de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, Puerto Rico, 15-17 February.
Crane, Catherine
1960 *Mr. Carr of State: forty-seven years in the Department of State*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
Dent, Louis A. to John B. Moore, 5 September
1898 Dispatches from the U. S. Consuls in Jamaica, 1837-1906, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Center for Historical Research/University of Puerto Rico/Río Piedras.
Deslile, Emile S. to William R. Day, 27 December
1899 Dispatches from the U. S. Consuls in St. Basseterre, Leeward Islands, 1875-1906, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Center for Historical Research, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras. (Hereafter Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP).
Eckes, Alfred E.
1995 *Opening America's market: U. S. foreign trade policy since 1776*, Chapel Hill, The University of South Carolina Press.

Estades Font, María Eugenia
1988 *La presencia militar de Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico, 1898-1918: intereses estratégicos y dominación colonial*, Río Piedras, Ediciones Huracán.
Feiling, Keith
1946 *The life of Neville Chamberlain*, London, The Macmillan & Co., Ltd.
Fletcher, David M.
1984 "1861-1898 economic growth and diplomatic adjustment," in William H. Becker & Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., *Economics and world power: an assessment of american diplomacy since 1789*, New York, Columbia University Press.
Foner, Phillip S.
1972 *The Spanish-Cuban-American war and the birth of American imperialism, vol. 1: 1895-1898*, New York, Monthly Review Press.
Friedberg, Aaron L.
1988 *The weary titan: Britain and the experience of relative decline, 1895-1905*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Frucht, Richard
1975 "Emancipation and revolt in the West Indies: St. Kitts, 1834," *Science and Society*, 34, no. 2, 199-214.
Furness, Alan
1961 "Two views of sugar on Estridge's Estate, St. Christopher: 1778-1792 and 1892-18797," in John Brown, ed., *Leewards: writings, past and present, about the Leeward Islands*, Bridgetown, Department of Extra-Mural Studies, Leeward Islands, U.C.W.I.
Galloway, J. H.
1989 *The sugar cane industry: an historical geography from its origins to 1914*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
1996 "Botany in the service of empire: the Barbados Cane-Breeding Program and the revival of the Caribbean sugar industry, 1880s-1930s," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 86, no. 4, 682-706.
García, Gervasio Luis
1997 "Strangers in Paradise? Puerto Rico en la correspondencia de los cónsules norteamericanos (1869-1900)," *op. cit., Boletín del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas*, no. 9, 27-55.
García Muñiz, Humberto
1988 *La estrategia de los Estados Unidos y la militarización del Caribe*, Río Piedras, Instituto de Estudios del Caribe, Universidad de Puerto Rico.
1997a "Interregional transfer of biological technology in the Caribbean: the impact of Barbados' John R. Bovell's Cane Research in the Puerto Rican Sugar Industry," *Revista Mexicana del Caribe*, II, no. 3, 6-40.
1997b *The South Porto Rico sugar company: the history of a U. S. multinational*

corporation in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, 1900-1921, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.

Garrity, John A.
1953 *Henry Cabot Lodge: a biography*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf.

Geerlings, H. C. Prinsen
1912 *The world's cane sugar industry: past and present*, New York, Norman Rodger.

Hall, Douglas
1985 *Five of the Leewards 1834-1870: the major problems of the post-emancipation period in Antigua, Barbuda, Montserrat, Nevis and St. Kitts*, Great Britain, Caribbean Universities Press/Ginn and Co. Ltd.

Halsey, Frederic M.
1918 *Investments in Latin America and the British West Indies*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office (U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Special Agents Series No. 169).

Harris, Gerard, special agent and various U. S. consular officers,
1917 *The West Indies as an export field*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office (U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Special Agents Series, no. 141).

Hart, Richard
1988 "Origin and development of the working class in the English-speaking Caribbean Area 1897-1937," in Malcolm Cross & Gad Heuman, eds., *Labour in the Caribbean: from emancipation to independence*, London, Macmillan Caribbean.

Hartog, Johan
1971 *US Consul in 19th century Curaçao*, Aruba-Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, Van Dorp & Co. N.V.

Haven, Joseph Haven to Alvey A. Adee, 26 November
1899 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Haven, Joseph to Herbert H. D. Peirce, 26 July
1902 Basseterre/Dispatches, CHR/UPR/RP.

Haven, Joseph to Herbert H. D. Peirce, 18 February
1903 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Haven, Joseph to Herbert H. D. Peirce, 20 July
1903 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Haven, Joseph to Herbert H. D. Peirce, 18 January
1904 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Healy, David
1988 *Drive to hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean 1898-1917*, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press.

Herwig, Holger
1986 *Germany's vision of empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Horsman, Reginald
1981 *Race and Manifest Destiny: the origins of American racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Ibarra, Jorge
1996 "Cultura e identidad nacional en el Caribe hispano: el caso puertorriqueño y el cubano," in Consuelo Naranjo, *et al.*, *La nación soñada: Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas*, Madrid, Doce Calles.

Joseph, Cedric L.
1973 "The strategic importance of the British West Indies," *The Journal of Caribbean History*, 6, May, 23-67.

Kennedy, Paul
1989 *The rise and fall of the great powers*, New York, Vintage Books.

Kneer, Warren G.
1975 *Great Britain and the Caribbean: a study of Anglo-American relations*, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press.

Kubicek, Robert V.
1969 *The administration of imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain and the colonial office*, Durnham, N. C., Duke University Press.

LaFeber, Walter
1979 *The Panama Canal: the crisis in historical perspective*, rev. ed., New York, Oxford University Press.

Lewis, Gordon K.
1983 *Main currents of Caribbean Thought: the historical evolution of Caribbean society in its ideological aspects, 1492-1900*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Logan, Rayford W.
1941 *The diplomatic relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891*, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press.

Mahan, A. T., Captain
1890a *The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783*, reprint, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1980.
1890b "The United States Looking Outward," *The interest of america in sea power, present and future*, reprint, Port Washington, N. Y., Kennikat Press, 1970.
1897 "Strategic features of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico," *The interest of america in sea power, present and future*, reprint, Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press, 1970.

Maingot, Anthony
1993 "Haiti and the Terrified Consciousness of the Caribbean in the 19th century: implications for the 21st century," Paper Presented at "Looking Forward: Ethnicity and Social Structure in Afro-America." A Conference in Honor of Harry Hoetink, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, January 21-22.

Martínez Fernández, Luis
1994 *Torn between empires: economy, society and patterns of political thought in the Hispanic Caribbean, 1840-1878*, Athens, University of Georgia Press.
May, Robert E.
1979 "Lobbyists for commercial empire: Jane Cazneau, William Cazneau, and U. S. Caribbean policy, 1846-1878," *Pacific Historical Review*, 48, no. 3, August, 383-412.
Mcquade, James
1890 *The cruise of the Montauk to Bermuda, the West Indies and Florida*, New York, Worthington Co.
Meikle, Louis S.
1912 *Confederation of the British West Indies versus annexation to the United States of America: a political discourse*, reprint, New York, Negro Universities Press.
Mélendez, Edgardo
1988 *Puerto Rico's statehood movement*, New York, Greenwood Press.
Merrill, Gordon C.
1958 *The historical geography of St. Kitts and Nevis, West Indies*, Mexico, Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia.
Miami Herald
1997 "Nevis lawmakers vote for Secession," 16 October.
Mitchell, Nancy
1996 "The height of the German challenge: the venezuela blockade," *Diplomatic History*, 20, no. 2, Spring, 185-209.
Montague, Ludwell Lee
1940 *Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938*, Durham, Duke University Press.
Moore, John Bassett
1898 *History and digest of the international arbitrations to which the United States has been a party*, vol. 1, Washington, Government Printing Office.
Moore, Leopold to Edwin Uhl, 24 February.
1896 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.
Nelson, William Javier
1990 *Almost a territory: America's attempt to annex the Dominican Republic*, Newark, University of Delaware Press.
Nevins, Allan
1957 *Hamilton Fish: the inner history of the grant administration*, vol. 1, rev. ed., New York, F. Ungar Pub. Co.
The New York Times
1900 "Negroes threaten whites. Inhabitants of Le François in Martinique flee for their lives. rioters demonstrate," 13 February, 2.
1900 "The situation in France's colonies," 18 February, 7.
1900 "Editorial: the troubles in Martinique," 20 February, 6.

1900 "America under suspicion. The *Figaro* says the United States has a part in the troubles in Martinique," 25 February, 7.

Nichols, Roy F.

1933 "Trade relationships and the establishments of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 13, no. 3, August, 289-313.

Nicolas, Armand

1996 *Histoire de la Martinique de 1848 à 1939*, tome 2, Paris, L'Harmattan.

Núñez Polanco, Diómedes

1997 *Anexionismo y resistencia: relaciones dominico-norteamericanas en tiempos de Grant, Báez y Luperón*, Santo Domingo, Editora Alfa & Omega.

Ojeda Reyes, Félix

1998 *El desterrado de París: biografía del Dr. Ramón Emeterio Betances*, unpublished manuscript.

Orde, Anne

1996 *The eclipse of Great Britain: the United States and British imperial decline, 1895-1956*, New York, St. Martin's Press.

Pares, Richard

1968 *Yankees and Creoles: the trade between North America and the West Indies before the American Revolution*, Hamden, Conn., Archon Books.

Paterson, Thomas G.

1966 "American businessmen and Consular Reform, 1890's to 1906," *Business History Review*, 40, no. 1, Spring, 78-97.

Paolino, Ernest N.

1973 *The foundations of the American empire: William Henry Seward and U. S. Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

Percival, Lewis H. to William W. Rockhill, February 13

1897 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Percival, Lewis H. to Assistant Secretary of State, March 23

1897 Dispatches/Basseterre, CHR/UPR/RP.

Pérez, Jr., Louis

1990 *Cuba and the United States: ties of intimacy*, Athens, The University of Georgia Press.

Pino Santos, Oscar

1975 *La oligarquía yanqui en Cuba*, México, Nuestro Tiempo.

Plummer, Brenda Gayle

1988 *Haiti and the great powers, 1902-1915*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University.

Portell Vila, Herminio

1938 *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España*, vol. 1, reprint, Miami, Mnemosyine Publishing, Inc.

Ragatz, Lowell J.
1928 *The fall of the planter class in the British Caribbean*, reprint, New York, Octagon Books.
Ramos Mattei, Andrés A.
1974 "Las inversiones norteamericanas en Puerto Rico y la Ley Foraker, 1898-1900," *Caribbean Studies*, 14, no. 3, October, 53-69.
1987 *Betances en el ciclo revolucionario antillano: 1867-1875*, San Juan, Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña.
1988 *La sociedad del azúcar en Puerto Rico: 1870-1910*, Río Piedras, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras.
Report of the West India Royal Commission
1897 London, Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Report of the West India Royal Commission, Appendix C, Vol. III, Part III.
St. Kitts-Nevis
1897 The Committee of the Agricultural Society, "Memorandum," London, Printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Reuter, Bertha Ann
1924 *Anglo-American relations during the Spanish-American War*, New York, The Macmillan Company.
Richards, Glen
1989 "Masters and servants: the growth of the labor movement in St. Christopher-Nevis, 1896-1956," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge.
1995 "The pursuit of 'Higher Wages' & 'Perfect Personal Freedom' , St. Kitts Nevis 1836-1956," in Mary Turner, ed., *From chattel slaves to wage slaves: the dynamics of labour bargaining in the Americas*, London, Kingston, Bloomington, James Currey Ltd., Ian Randle Publishers Ltd. and Indiana University Press, 1995.
Richardson, Bonham C.
1983 *Caribbean migrants: environment and human survival in St. Kitts and Nevis*, Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press.
Rodríguez, José Ignacio
1900 *Estudio histórico sobre el origen, desenvolvimiento y manifestaciones prácticas de la idea de la anexión de la isla de Cuba a los Estados Unidos de América*, La Habana, Imprenta La Propaganda Literaria.
Rodney, Walter
1981 *A history of the Guyanese working people, 1881-1905*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rodríguez Demorizi, Emilio
1960 "Prefacio y notas," in *Informe de la comisión de los E.U.A. en Santo Domingo en 1871*, Ciudad Trujillo, Editora Montalvo.

Rosenberg, Emily S.
1982 *Spreading the American Dream: American economic and cultural expansion, 1890-1945*, New York, Hill & Wang.
Saul, S. B.
1957 "The economic significance of 'Constructive Imperialism'," *The Journal of Economic History*, 17, no. 2, June, 173-192.
Schnakenbourg, Christian
1982 "The French West Indian sugar industry in the mid-nineteenth century (1835-1883): crisis and change," in Christopher Abel and Michael Twaddle, eds., *Caribbean Societies*, vol. 2, *Collected Seminar Papers No. 34*, London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.
Semple, Ellen C.
1903 *American history and its geographical conditions*, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co.
Sheridan, Richard
1974 *Sugar and slavery: an economic history of the West Indies*, Barbados, Caribbean Universities Press.
St. Johnstone, Sir Reginald
1936 *From a colonial's governor's notebook*, London, Hutchinson & Co. (Publications) Ltd.
Stuart, Graham H.
1936 *American diplomatic and consular practice*, New York, Appleton-Century Company.
1949 *The Department of State: a history of its organization, procedure and personnel*, New York, The Macmillan Co.
Tansill, Charles C.
1932 *The purchase of the Danish West Indies*, reprint, New York, Greenwood Publishers.
1938 *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873: a chapter in Caribbean diplomacy*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Taylor, Frank F.
1993 *To hell with paradise: a history of the Jamaica tourist industry*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.
Tilchin, William L.
1995 "Theodore Roosevelt and Anglo-American relations and the Jamaica incident of 1907," *Diplomatic History*, 19, no. 3, Summer, 385-406.
Ulibarri, George S. & John Harrison
1974 *Guide to materials on Latin America in the National Archives of the United States*, Washington, D. C., National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration.